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IMPEACHMENT IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASES
The Following Article, Addressed to Counsel
Who Appear at Administrative Hearings, is
Commended to the Attention of
Presiding Administrative Law Judges-Ed.
Calvin William Sharpe

*/

The lawyer for the union is putting on his casein-chief. Part of his evidence is the testimony of one
Jimmy Crisp, an employee in the production and maintenance
bargaining unit. Crisp claims that your defendant's president, James A. Miller, threatened to fire him if he continued his union activity.
Your defense is that Mr. Miller never threatened
Crisp for union activity, but rather discharged him for
cause. Miller says Crisp was an unreliable employee who
would often show up late for work. Miller says Crisp is
just raising the supposed threats concerning union activity
as a smoke screen. Your case is simple; the problem will be
in proving it.
Unfortunately, you do not think you will get any
worthwhile admissions from Crisp or make any headway attacking his perception or memory on cross-examination. So you
start scratching around for ways to impeach Crisp, hoping to
discredit his testimony in the eyes of the administrative
law judge.
That evening you get the kind of present trial
lawyers appreciate. You interview Joe Long, Crisp's fellow
employee in the production department. Long tells you that
Crisp has a reputation in the department as a liar. Should
you call Long to discredit Crisp? It would work in a jury
trial. Bad reputation for truth and veracity is a classic
way to attack a witness who has testified, and under Rule
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608(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the evidence may be
in the forgi of an opinion as well as reputation. Since the
rules of evidence are relaxed in administrative hearings,
there is no reason not to use the evidence, so long as the
administrative law judge thinks it is worth listening to.
Joe Long also tells you that Crisp stole money
from the company's petty-cash box. Can you have Long
testify about the theft as well? This looks even stronger
than the information about Crisp's reputation. Here are
facts, not just opinions, and it looks like they reflect
directly on Crisp's credibility.
But if this were a jury trial, the specific facts
about Crisp's theft would be inadmissible. Not that vague
generalities are thought of as being more valuable than
details. Instead, the common law rules of evidence recognize that while Crisp's credibility is important, it is just
one of the issues, and to keep the trial on course, the
rules forbid having one trial inside another on details like
this. So when a witness's credibility is attacked in a
trial, opinion and reputation--but not extrinsic evidence of
specific acts of conduct--are admissible in evidence. The
common law rule applies in federal courts as well, Fed. R.
Evid. 608(b).
But administrative hearings are different. The
administrative law judge's discretion is what keeps the
trial on the proper subject, not mechanical rules of evidence. So if the administrative law judge thinks the theft
has enough bearing on Crisp's credibility, there is no rule
that would keep you from asking Long about it--or crossexamining Crisp himself about it.
These two examples make an important point:
In
administrative hearings, you must unlearn your traditional
trial habits. Administrative law judges do not apply strict
evidentiary rules. Generally, they may consider any "oral
or documentary evidence . . . [that is not]

irrelevant,

immaterial, or unduly repetitious."
5 U.S.C. Sec. 556(d).
This means that there is a whole list of evidence that would
be objectionable in a formal trial that may be admissible in
an administrative hearing. It includes:
--

hearsay;

--

extrinsic evidence contradicting a witness's
testimony on "collateral" matters;

--

prior convictions;
arrests; and

--

--

bad acts.

The point is not that this evidence will necessarily be admitted, but rather that it will not necessarily be
excluded. The reason for this flexibility is the administrative law judge's presumed competence to ignore improper
evidence and to weigh the rest on the scales of his good
judgment.
Some agency statutes are more restrictive than the
Administrative Procedure Act and similar state statutes.
The National Labor Relations Act, for example, goes further
than most agency statutes by requiring the application of
the Federal Rules of Evidence "so far as practicable."
Still, courts interpret this qualifying language as expanding admissibility rather than contracting it. Agencies may
not exclude evidence that would be admitted under the rules,
and administrative law judges must, "if in doubt, let it
in."
Multi-Medical Convalescent and Nursing Center of
Towson v. NLRB, 550 F.2d 974 (4th Cir. 1977).
The lawyer accustomed to trying cases in court
should be aware that when he sets foot in an administrative
hearing room, he enters a different arena with different
rules. By keeping the flexibility of the evidentiary rules
in mind, the lawyer trying an administrative case will find
that he has more--and sometimes more damaging--weapons to
use.

With all this flexibility, the irony is that many
lawyers who try administrative cases fail to use even
traditional impeachment techniques because the informality
of the proceedings seems somehow inconsistent with the drama
of cross-examination by old standby techniques, such as
confronting the witness with a prior inconsistent statement.
By forsaking both traditional and innovative impeachment
techniques, some lawyers who try administrative cases are
less effective than they could be. Here are some more
examples of what can be done.
Even under the most liberal rules (like the
Federal and Revised Uniform Rules of Evidence), judges
exclude extrinsic evidence to impeach witnesses' testimony
on "collateral" matters. Here is how it works: While the
common law permits witnesses to be cross-examined on collateral points, that is where things halt. A witness cannot be
contradicted on a collateral point by calling another
witness to the stand or introducing some other contradictory

evidence.
matter."

That is "impeaching a witness on a collateral

Administrative law judges, in contrast, have broad
discretion to receive extrinsic evidence on collateral
matters.
Now suppose that Crisp had been passed over for a
promotion recently, and then he told his foreman that when
the National Labor Relations Board proceedings began, he
would "pay the company back." You confront him with the
remark on his cross-examination, but he denies it. Can you
call Crisp's supervisor to contradict him?
It depends. In a jury trial, the judge might not
let you prove Crisp's former statement. Normally, bias is
never collateral, and you should be permitted to use this
evidence in a trial. But there is the danger that the trial
judge might not understand how importantly this information
touches on bias. In that case, he might exclude Crisp's
former statement as simply being "impeachment on a collateral matter."
But the administrative hearing is different.
Since the judge is not caught between two different rules,
the evidence should be admissible whether or not the judge
thinks it is "collateral." You should be able to put in the
damaging statement through Crisp's supervisor, effectively
undercutting Crisp's credibility.
Here is another example. Some trial judges are
pretty sticky about whether a prior statement can be used to
impeach a witness. These judges are fond of keeping crossexaminers from using prior contradictory statements on the
grounds that they are not damaging enough. The typical
adverse ruling is that the prior statement is "not a material
variation" from the testimony on direct examination.
You are not nearly as likely to encounter this
problem in administrative cases. If the prior statement
will aid the administrative law judge in assessing the
witness's credibility, it will be admitted.
Let us change the Crisp case again. Say Crisp had
given an affidavit to a labor board investigator, stating
that company president Miller had threatened to fire him if
he continued to solicit votes for the union. On direct
examination, Crisp testified to important details that were
not in his affidavit, including a remark he now says Miller

made to him.
as follows:

Your cross-examination of Crisp might proceed

Q. [In a nonintimidating manner calculated to
elicit his cooperation] Mr. Crisp, let me see if I understand your testimony. You said on your direct examination
that Mr. Miller walked up to you in the maintenance department while you were talking to another employee?
A.

That's right.

Q.

This was on November 12, 1983?

A.

That was the date.

Q. After he walked up, he asked to have a private
word with you?
A.

That's correct.

Q. After the two of you moved about 30 feet from
where you were having the conversation, he said to you, and
I quote, "I'm gonna fire you if you keep trying to run this
Is that right?
jnion game on my employees."
A.

That's right.

Q. You remembered those exact words, because it
was a serious threat and it made quite an impression upon
jou, right?
A.

It sure did.

Q. [Now that you have recommitted Crisp to his
But
3tatement on direct examination, you change your tone.]
4r. Crisp, you didn't say anything in your statement to the
board agent about Mr. Miller requesting a private word with
ou, did you?
A.

I don't remember.

Q. No? I'm showing you what has been marked for
identification as Respondent's Exhibit 1. That is your
affidavit, isn't it?

bottom?

A.

[No answer.]

Q.

(Persisting]

That's your signature at the

A.

Yes.

Q. Let me direct your attention to the third
paragraph, where you describe what happened. [Pause] There
is nothing there about Mr. Miller asking to have a private
word with you, is there?
A.

Not in this affidavit.

Proper cross-examination? In a jury trial, the
judge might sustain an objection to the questions about the
affidavit, finding "no material inconsistency."
That risk
is much lower in an administrative hearing. The evidence
should come in to undercut Crisp's credibility.
Unfortunately, the relaxed rules in an administrative case can hurt you as well as help you. Hearsay provides a good example. In an administrative proceeding,
hearsay may be offered against your client. If the hearsay
is relevant, it should come in. How do you impeach hearsay
statements offered against you?
The Federal Rules of Evidence provide a partial
answer to that question. Rule 806 provides:
When a hearsay statement, or a statement defined
in Rule 801(d)(2), (C), (D), or (E), has been
admitted in evidence, the credibility of the
declarant may be attacked, and if attacked may be
supported by any evidence which would be admissible for those purposes if declarant had testified
as a witness. Evidence of a statement or conduct
by the declarant at any time, inconsistent with
his hearsay statement, is not subject to any
requirement that he may have been afforded an
opportunity to deny or explain. If the party
against whom a hearsay statement has been admitted
calls the declarant as a witness, the party is
entitled to examine him on the statement as if
under cross-examination.
In other words, when hearsay is offered in a
trial*, the declarant's credibility is in issue just as if he
had been a witness. The whole range of impeachment is
available. Prior inconsistent statements may be introduced
in response to the hearsay, and the rule of confiontation
does not apply.

Rule 806 Is Powerful
Finally, if you decide to call the declarant
yourself, rather than just attack paper with other paper,
you can examine the declarant about the statement as if on
cross-examination.
Rule 806 is a powerful (and surprisingly little
known) provision. But it cannot cure every situation. What
if the hearsay declarant's testimony cannot be contradicted,
he has made no prior inconsistent statement, and his bias or
interest in the case cannot be demonstrated? Is there
anything left to do? Perhaps. Let us suppose a simple
case.
It is a hearing before a corrections board. A
prisoner is accused of inciting a disturbance in the prison.
The only evidence that the prison presents is a
written statement of a corrections officer. The officer is
not available for cross-examination. At stake is 30 days in
punitive segregated confinement for this offense. The
prisoner ought to be permitted to put on evidence that the
corrections officer has a reputation for making false
accusations against prisoners. A fellow inmate might be
called to the stand for the following examination:
Q.

Mr. Smith, you are an inmate at the Prairie

View corrections facility, are you not?
A.

Yes, I am.

Q.

How long have you been an inmate at this

A.

For 20 years.

Q.

Do you know Corrections Officer Jones?

A.

Yes.

Q.

How long have you known Mr. Jones?

facility?

A. Since he started working at the prison,
10 years ago.
Q. Are you familiar with his reputation for
truthfulness in dealing with inmates?

A.

Yes,

I am.

Q.

What is his reputation?

A. He has a bad reputation for dealing honestly
with inmates.
So far this same examination could be used in a
trial under Rule 806 of the Federal Rules of Evidence or
under the relaxed rules of evidence in administrative
hearings. But in the administrative case you can go even
further:
Q. Are you aware of any cases where Mr. Jones
falsely charged prisoners with wrongdoing?
A. I am aware of five cases involving other
inmates, myself included.
Q.

What happened in those cases?

In federal and state courts, even the most liberal
rules on impeachment by proof of untruthful character limit
the examination to the adverse witness's reputation for
dishonesty or the testifying witness's opinion of the.
untruthful character of the adverse witness. They do not
let the direct examiner prove specific conduct supporting
the reputation or opinion. Nor do they permit the examiner
to impugn the adverse witness's character by extrinsic
evidence of specific misconduct. See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid.
608(a) and (b).
But the possibility that side issues about specific
conduct of witnesses may distract and prejudice the fact-finder
is not generally a concern in administrative hearings.
The flexibility of evidence in administrative
cases can dovetail nicely with a sophisticated theory of the
case. See what can happen with evidence of criminal convictions:
It is a worker's compensation case. The worker
died as a result of a head injury, and the question is
whether he hurt his head at work or somewhere else.
At the industrial commission hearing, the dead
man's estate calls its star witness--a fast-food store clerk
who testifies that, on the night before the worker died, he

told the clerk that he had hit his head two hours before on
some machinery at work.
Your client, the employer, claims that the- worker
hit his head at an amusement park two days before his death.
You have a witness who will testify that the worker admitted
on the day that he died that he hurt his head at 'the amusement park.
So your witness and your adversary's witness are
engaged in a swearing contest.
It is worth thinking about whom to attack.
You
could impeach either the hearsay declarant (the dead man) or
your adversary's witness (the clerk).
Arguing that the dead
man told two different stories and so he should not be
trusted at all might not help. After all, you want the
administrative law judge to believe your witness's story
that the worker told him he hit his head at the amusement
park.
You may well decide it is better to go after the
clerk.
Now we are ready for his criminal record:
Q.

Mr. Clerk, you've been in trouble with the law

before, haven't you?
A.

What do you mean, "in trouble with the law"?

Q.

You have been convicted of a crime, haven't

A.

I have a conviction on my record, yes.

you?

Q.
On June 24, 1970, you were convicted in
Cuyahoga County Court for the theft of a watch that a
customer left at the National City Bank in Cleveland, Ohio.
Weren't you?
A.

Yes.

If the clerk denied the conviction, you could
introduce a certified copy of the judgment. The administrative law judge will take this evidence for what it's worth,
but meanwhile you have called into question the basic
character and integrity of the chief witness against your
client.
Could you use this same cross-examination in a
trial?
Many courts would exclude the evidence of this
conviction-on one or both of the following grounds:
(1) It
may not be considered a crime of dishonesty and, since it is
a misdemeanor, would not be serious enough to be used for

impeachment; or (2) the conviction is more than ten years
old. See e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 609.
In a formal trial, there
are also restrictions on the use of felony convictions and
pleas of nolo contendere, and the examiner could not ask
about the facts underlying a conviction or any aggravating
circumstances. In an administrative proceeding, there are
no such constraints.
Corrupt character is not the only way to impeach a
witness. Evidence of a witness's sensory or mental defect
may also make his testimony suspect. For example, the
Securities and Exchange Commission brings a disciplinary
action against your client, a registered investment advisor.
The SEC wants to suspend your client for violating antifraud
provisions of the Securities Exchange Act.
The SEC claims that your client advised a mutual
fund to open an account at a particular bank, but failed to
disclose that the bank had made substantial loans to her.
Your client's liability turns on her conversations with one
of the fund's directors, who testifies for the SEC. You
want to impeach his testimony that your client failed to
disclose her relationship to the bank.
During your case-in-chief, you produce a witness
who can testify that the fund director who testified against
your client is an alcoholic. You also produce a psychiatrist specializing in alcoholism who will testify that
long-term alcoholism severs the alcoholic's relationship
with reality and can render him unreliable.
It is easy to see that this evidence could undercut the director's credibility, depending on how adroitly it
is used. The strategic danger in this kind of attack on the
person is that the administrative law judge may think you
are off on a tangent. But in a case where the credibility
of an adverse witness is important, and the consequences of
an unfavorable finding would be dire for your client, the
benefit of an attack on the mental competence of the witness
can be worth its costs.
Scientific Link
Many courts exclude impeachment evidence of
chronic alcoholism or drug addition, unless the proponent
can show that it affected a witness's credibility in the
particular case. But there is some scientific evidence
linking addiction to untruthfulness, so the testimony on the
director's alcoholism should have some probative value. Cf.

Note, Testimonial Reliability of Drug Addicts, 35 N.Y.U.L.
Rev. 259, 270 (1960) (arguing that evidence of cocaine
addiction should be admissible to impeach witnesses' credibility).
This is the sort of counterattack that you may be
able to use in an administrative hearing, even though you
might not in a formal trial. The list of such possibilities
is bounded only by the lawyer's imagination.
What is true for impeachment techniques should be
equally true for rehabilitative devices. For example, the
general rule is that courts will not admit evidence of good
character unless the witness's character has first been
attacked. But evidence of truthful character should always
be admissible at an administrative hearing. Similarly,
prior consistent statements--which, in many jurisdictions,
are admissible only if made before a motive to fabricate
arose and if offered after a statement on the same subject
made at trial has been called into question--should be more
freely admissible in administrative proceedings to shore up
the credibility of your witnesses.
As administrative hearings become more formal,
there is a tendency for administrative law judges to follow
the rules of evidence more faithfully. You may run up
against an administrative law judge who is reluctant to hear
unorthodox forms of impeachment of the sort recommended
here. What should you do to overcome an administrative law
judge's resistance to creative impeachment?
Persuade.
Remind the judge of his obligation to make findings based on "relevant, reliable, and probative" evidence.
Point out that your impeachment will help him to assess the
witnesses' reliability and weigh the credibility of the
evidence offered against you. Explain to the judge how
impeachment will enhance the reliability of his findings of
fact.
Impeachment is a weapon aimed at discrediting the
witness by impugning his honesty, integrity, or capacity.
It is a personal attack. Often impeachment is the only
device that will deliver the discrediting blow to damaging
but apparently credible testimony.
As in a formal trial, how you use impeachment in
an administrative hearing will depend on the objectives of
your cross-examination. If you want to draw out favorable
admissions and also to impeach the witness's credibility on

other points, your timing must reflect these purposes. Get
the helpful admissions out while the witness is still
credible--immediately after his direct. Attacks on the
character of the witness should usually be saved until the
end of the examination. At that point, you no longer need
the witness to give helpful testimony and you can let him
have it.
Often you must choose between seeking concessions
and impeaching the witness's credibility. Though technically
permissible, mixing constructive cross-examination and
impeachment is usually persuasive. You need to decide
whether you want the trier of fact to believe the withess or
not. Once you resolve to discredit a witness in an administrative hearing, though, you ought to do the job with all
the zeal you would bring to a cross-examination in a formal
trial. At the same time, you should keep in mind the b1gger
arsenal of impeachment weapons that you have when the rules
of evidence are loose generalities to which you can usually
make an exception.

